Showing posts with label Belarus. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Belarus. Show all posts

Friday, March 14, 2014

The Reincarnation of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth & Eastern Germany


http://www.electricpolitics.com/media/mp3/EP2014.02.24.mp3

Also at http://prorevnews.blogspot.com/2014/02/we-interrupt-ukraine-news-with-some.html

Very interesting interview.

George Kenney interviews Russian scholar Stephen F Cohen about Ukraine

See it especially at 17:00-22:00 and 35:00-42:00

Suggests allowing Kiev-Ukraine to join as a junior partner with Lithuania and Poland, in order to preserve Russian oriented southern and eastern areas of Ukraine for Russia.  Lithuania and Poland are here identified as the two countries at the forefront of pushing EU regime change in Ukraine, with the support of Germany.
19:10  They would as you say draw a red line on say Sevastopol, and so for Washington to think they we can wrest these territories from Russian orbit is extremely dangerous, and its not going to happen.

And its not going to happen.

Russia is not going to let eastern Ukraine go.

Actually, If Putin asked my opinion

If I were a patriotic Russian citizen instead of a patriotic American citizen as I am

I would say to Putin what do you want western Ukraine for anyway its nothing but trouble? I they want to go and be a junior poor partner with Lithuania and Poland and oh by the way it is Poland and Lithuania that have been driving this EU march on Ukraine, let them go. They are not Russian … western Ukraine was part of the polish empire, part of the Austrian empire; it has few affinities with Russia, whereas eastern Ukraine is Russian essentially. Let them go. And what do you get? You get the most populous part of Ukraine, that’s eastern and southern Ukraine. You preserve your naval base. … you won’t have the basket-case of western Ukraine
Mentions 'sidebar' story of Germany to become more assertive, with the need for Polish compensation to the east.
36:20 You mentioned Poland and Lithuania pushing for some change in Ukraine… What is your sense of the German role in all of this?

Well that’s the sidebar story but an important one. I can’t claim expertise on it but I looked into it asked people, and it appears to have this pre-history. Poland is very nervous about Germany’s growing role in Europe. So Poland wanted some empire of its own, like it …[once had]. It wanted Ukraine … to offset German economic and political influence. Meanwhile Germans has been talking about a more assertive foreign policy- taking more leadership. Now you got to remember that the wounds of WW2 are not completely healed; so when you tell a Polish citizen of a certain generation that Germany’s going to get more assertive, they get a little worried. So they wanted to enhance their sphere of influence economically and politically, and Poland was the ticket.
Ghosts of the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth
http://continuingcounterreformation.blogspot.com/2013/12/ukraine-split-ghosts-of-polish.html

Sunday, March 9, 2014

Gorbachev Offered Riga Line to Poland & 'Kalingrad Oblast' to Germany in 1990

'Riga Line' the pre-WW2 Polish eastern border with the U.S.S.R.
mutually agreed upon March 18, 1921;
plus 'Kalingrad Oblast' Sold to Germany for 48 Billion DM



Found this on a facebook page
In 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev suggested meeting in Moscow G-Dragon, the return of the Eastern Lands in two versions.

First: the return of Vilnius, Lviv and Kremenets;
 

The second arrondissement of Grodno from the wilderness Belovezhskaya Pushcha and the former province. The Lviv Centre for petroleum. The reason for this proposal was the cancellation of the jałtańskich agreements and mutual waiver of claims for compensation.
 

Soon, Jaruzelski has adopted proposals for Gorbachev on behalf of Polish. When the case came to Warsaw, Mr Geremek, Michnik, Kuroń and Mazowiecki went in haste to Moscow and almost kneel wybłagali Gorbachev not to do. What kind of influence they used no one knows, in the end

Gorbachev przystal on their requests. Consul General in Krakow, p. Serdaczuk was talking about in the presence of Prof. Edward Prus. Also confirmed is the Member of Lithuania to the USSR Jan Ciechanowicz in an interview with Stanislaw Sadowskim from Toronto. It also said the New York press. It was published in the National No 4 (2) (2006).

 Apparently the same Gorbachev did with Kohl by Wrocław and Szczecin during talks about zjednoczenkiu Germany, but Kohl said he would wait for the traffic to the poles. Source: Helmut Kohl said a German journalist Dieter Shmitzke on June 1, 2005 and published in the newspaper "Bayerische Fulle" Nr. 2.

As for 'Kalingrad Oblast' - the northern portion of pre-1945 German East Prussia:

see page 12 at http://www.russian-lawyer.co.uk/Kaliningrad_Integration.pdf
Seemingly, the Society of East Prussia expects a change in the status of Kaliningrad to occur sooner or later. In his address to the 2000 national meeting of the Eastern Prussians, the speaker of the SEP, Wilhelm von Gottberg, pointed out that it will be impossible to preserve the present status of the “Königsberg region” permanently. He gave expression to his hope that someone will take a chance to change its status and that the opportunity will not be lost, as was the case when Gorbachev offered to sell Kaliningrad to Germany and the German government rejected the offer.
17
In his later interview “The Königsberg region and its perspectives”18 he even mentioned a concrete purchase price estimated of 48 billion DM. Kohl and Genscher rejected the offer and the major Genscher reason was that he did not want to have “Königsberg as a gift”.

If I recall correctly, I have seen an account of this with Kohl turning down the offer as if it were premature, with words to the effect of East Prussia having to return to Germany under the proper set of circumstances, as if already predetermined.

 

Tuesday, February 11, 2014

Polish Kresy Re-Annexation Now Discussed As Possible



Polish Re-annexation of Eastern Lands - Kresy - Now Discussed as Possible - December 2013 -
as Wlodimir Putin's Achilles Heal...

An intelligent proposal for an ethnically inclusive, outright encouraging people from today's Belorussia and Ukraine to declare themselves as Polish via a green card program for those migrating to the current Poland.   Ethnic Russians would be welcome to declare Polish nationality, even if lacking any paperwork showing say a Polish/Polonized grand-parent- all ethnic groups so invited. 

This matches the logical model of the traditional Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as a pro-Polish multi-ethnic state started with Casmir III, so refined by the Treaty of Haidych proposal for a Polish-Lithuanian-Rutheniun Commonwealth- elevating the Ruthenians to co-equal status with Poles and Lithuanians.


It would be a continued via Joseph Pilsudski and his alliance with Symon Petlura, followed by the subsequent Volhynia Experiment.
from wikipedia:

The Volhynia Experiment was a cultural and political program by the interwar Polish government in the province of Volhynia whose purpose was the create a Ukrainian identity that was also loyal to the Polish state. It was hoped that this program would furthermore lead to pro-Polish sympathies in Soviet Ukraine and serve as a possible aide in Polish plans concerning the Soviet Union.[1] The Volhynian Experiment was opposed by both Ukrainian nationalists from neighboring Galicia and by pro-Soviet communists.

In 1928 Henryk Józewski, the former deputy minister for internal affairs in the Ukrainian government of Symon Petliura, was nominated the voivode, or governor, of Volhynia, to carry out the program of cultural and religious autonomy for Ukrainians in that region. Józewski, a Pole from Kiev (where, unlike in Galicia, Poles and Ukrainians had a history of cooperating with one another),[2] was a Ukrainophile who felt that the Polish and Ukrainian nations were deeply connected and that Ukraine might one day become a "Second fatherland" for Poles. [3] Like many Poles from Kiev, he was bilingual in the Ukrainian and Polish languages. [4]

Józewski brought Ukrainian followers of Symon Petliura, including former officers in Petliura's army, to his capital of Lutsk in order to help in his Volhynian administration. He hung portraits of Petliura alongside those of Pilsudski in public places, [3] founded the Institute for the Study of Nationality Affairs and educational society for the Orthodox (which expanded to 870 chapters in Volhynia), subsidized Ukrainian reading societies (by 1937, it had 5,000 chapters), and sponsored Ukrainian Theater. The use of Ukrainian language, instead of Russian, during church sermons was encouraged.

A loyal Ukrainian political party, the Volhynian Ukrainian Alliance, was created. .[5] This party was the only Ukrainian political party allowed to freely function in Volhynia.[3] Its programme called for democracy, a separation of church and state, and equality for all citizens. Although many of its supporters, former officers of Symon Petliura, had committed anti-Jewish pogroms in Volhynia during the period the Revolution, under Jozewski's influence antisemitism was not tolerated. [3]
Two groups competed with Jozewski and his pro-Polish Ukrainian allies for the allegiance of the Volhynian Ukrainians: the Communists and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), based in Galicia. The Communists referred to the Volhynian Experiment as a "Petliurite Occupation", and set up a front party, the Peasant Worker Alliance. The Peasant Worker Alliance, whose affiliation with the Communist party was unknown by most of its supporters, grew to be the most popular party in Volhynia, until it was banned by Jozewski in 1932. Soviet-based partisans fought Jozewski's police in the marshes of northern Volhynia. [3]

While the Communists were coming to Volhynia from the East, Ukrainian nationalists entered from the South. The OUN saw Volhynia as fertile ground for the expansion of its Ukrainian nationalist ideal. By 1935 it was reported that 800 OUN members were operating in Volhynia; they had penetrated many of the Ukrainian institutions that Jozewski had created. According to Jozewski's rivals in the Polish military, the pro-Polish Petliurite Ukrainians in Volhynia failed to match the OUN in terms of organization and numbers.[3]

During the period of his governance, Józewski was the object of two assassination attempts: by Soviet agents in 1932 and by Ukrainian nationalists in 1934.[6]

Cancellation of the Volhynia Experiment

After his sponsor Pilsudski's death in 1935, Józewski's Ukrainian programme was cancelled. The anti-Ukrainian Polish elements in the Polish military took control over policies in Volhynia. Józewski was criticized for allowing Ukrainians to buy land from Poles, Orthodox churches were demolished or converted to Catholic use during the "revindication" campaign, and by 1938 Józewski himself lost his post.[1][7] Under his successor, all state support for Ukrainian institutions was eliminated, and it was recommended that Polish officials cease using the words "Ukraine" or "Ukrainian." [8] The Polish army Generals believed that filling all state offices in Volhynia with ethnic Poles would ensure fast mobilization and prevent sabotage in case of a Soviet attack on Poland.[9] Ukrainians were systematically denied the opportunity to obtain government jobs.[10] Although the majority of the local population was Ukrainian, virtually all government official positions were assigned to Poles. Land reform designed to favour the Poles[11] brought further alienation of the Ukrainian population..[12]

Military colonists were settled in Volhynia to defend the border against Soviet intervention.[9] Despite the ethnic Ukrainian lands being overpopulated and Ukrainian farmers being in need of land, the Polish government's land reforms gave land from large Polish estates not to local villagers but to Polish colonists.[10] This number was estimated at 300,000 in both Galicia and Volhynia by Ukrainian sources and less than 100,000 by Polish sources (see osadnik) [13]

Plans were made for a new round of colonization of Volhynia by Polish military veterans and Polish civilians and hundreds of new Roman Catholic churches were planned for the new colonists and for converts from Orthodoxy.[8]

Volhynia after the Experiment

The ultimate result of Polish policies in Volhynia was that a sense of Ukrainian patriotism was created; however this patriotism was not tied to the Polish state.[1] As a result of the anti-Ukrainian Polish policies that followed the Polish government's cancellation of the Volhynian Experiment, both Ukrainian nationalists and Communists found fertile ground for their ideas among the Volhynian Ukrainian population.[8] Eventually, the Polish population of the area would be destroyed in the Massacres of Poles in Volhynia.
That Massacre of Polish peoples - whether Polish speaking or simply even Polish appearing thus representing a predatory form of nationalism disregarding the individual's right to chose a national affiliation -- followed those earlier throughout the Ukraine against the "KulAK's", and such was a logical component of a grand strategy of wars of religion resulting in Poland's 'cleansing' and shiftward west.



Monday, December 30, 2013

Towards A Polish Ruthenian Commonwealth

the proposed Polish-Lithuanian-Ruthenium Commonwealth
to elevate the Cossacks and Ruthenians to the position equal to that of Poland and Lithuania as a "Commonwealth of Three Nations"

this idea was OPPOSED by the Roman Catholic Church,
with the Jesuit Counter Reformation selling out Poland for its geopolitical objectives



File:January Uprising.svg

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polish%E2%80%93Lithuanian%E2%80%93Ruthenian_Commonwealth

Polish–Lithuanian–Ruthenian Commonwealth (Polish: Rzeczpospolita Trojga Narodów, Commonwealth of Three Nations) was a proposed (but never actually created) European state in the 17th century that would replace contemporal Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth.

The creation of a Duchy of Ruthenia was considered at various times, particularly during the 1648 Cossack insurrection against Polish rule in Ukraine (see Khmelnytsky Uprising). Such a Ruthenian duchy, as proposed in the 1658 Treaty of Hadiach, would have been a full-fledged member of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, which would thereby have become a tripartite Polish–Lithuanian–Ruthenian Commonwealth. In May 1659, the Polish Diet (Sejm) ratified the treaty with an emended text.[1]

The idea of a Ruthenian Duchy within the Commonwealth was completely abandoned.[2] Canadian historian Paul Robert Magosci believes that it happened due to divisions among the Cossacks and Muscovite invasion[3] which, however, both occurred much earlier than the Treaty of Hadiach was signed. Russian historian Tairova-Yakovleva considers the resistance of the Polish society and the papal pressure as the reasons for the incomplete ratification.

The idea of Polish–Lithuanian–Ruthenian Commonwealth returned during the January Uprising, when in 1861, a patriotic demonstration took place at Horodło. The so-called Second Union of Horodło was announced there, by the szlachta of Congress Poland, former Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Volhynia and Podolia. New Poland, based on the Second Union of Horodlo was to be based on the three nations, and its proposed coat of arms consisted of Polish eagle, Lithuanian Pahonia, and patron saint of Ruthenia, Archangel Michael.

Towards this end was the Treaty of Hadiach

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duchy_of_Ruthenia

The Treaty of Hadiach (Polish: ugoda hadziacka; Ukrainian: гадяцький договір) was a treaty signed on 16 September 1658 in Hadiach (Hadziacz, Hadiacz, Гадяч) between representatives of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth (represented by S. Bieniewski and K. Jewłaszewski) and Cossacks (represented by Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky and starshina (sztarszna, the elders) Yuri Nemyrych, architect of the treaty, and Pavlo Teteria). It was designed to elevate the Cossacks and Ruthenians to the position equal to that of Poland and Lithuania in the Polish–Lithuanian union and in fact transforming the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth into a Polish–Lithuanian–Ruthenian Commonwealth (Rzeczpospolita Trojga Narodów, "Commonwealth of Three Nations").

The specific features of the Treaty of Hadiach were:
  1. creation of the Duchy of Ruthenia (Polish: Księstwo Ruskie) from Chernigov Voivodeship, Kiev Voivodeship and Bratslav Voivodeship (The Cossack negotiators had originally demanded that Ruthenian Voivodeship, Volhynian Voivodship, Belz Voivodeship, and Podolian Voivodeship be included as well), which would be governed by a Cossack hetman, elected for life from among four candidates presented by the Cossacks and confirmed by the King of Poland;
  2. creation of parallel Ruthenian offices, tribunal, academy (Kiev's Orthodox Collegium would be raised to the status of an academy; a second Orthodox higher institution of learning would be founded; and as many schools and printing presses "as were necessary" would be established), a judicial system, treasury and mint as existed in Poland and Lithuania (see Offices in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth);
  3. the Duchy would be connected with the Commonwealth by the common king. There would be only one national parliament (Sejm) and one foreign policy in the Polish–Lithuanian–Ruthenian Commonwealth;
  4. admission to the Senate of Orthodox ecclesiastic members: the Archbishop (metropolitan) of Kiev and other Orthodox bishops (of Lutsk, Lviv, Przemyśl, Chełm and Mstislav) and elevation of the Orthodox religion and Church to the same level as Catholicism. No Uniate monasteries or churches were to be built in the Duchy - the Union of Brest would be dissolved on the territory of the Ruthenian Duchy;
  5. ennoblement of Cossack elders (starshyna kozatska). Each year the hetman would recommend to the king 1,000 Cossacks to receive a patent of hereditary nobility, and up to 100 Cossacks in each military regiment could be personally ennobled as well.
  6. establishment of a Cossack army, in the form of the Cossack register of 30,000. The officers of these forces would be elected by their own members. The Cossacks' own forces would be supplemented by 10,000 regular mercenaries, paid from public taxes. No other Commonwealth troops were to be allowed in Rus' without the consent of the Cossack hetman, except in the event of war, and then they would come under the Cossack hetman's command;
  7. return of land and property to Commonwealth nobility (szlachta), which had been confiscated by Cossacks after the 1648 Khmelnytsky Uprising;
  8. a general amnesty for previous crimes would be decreed.
History and Importance

Historian Andrew Wilson has called this "one of the great 'What-ifs?' of Ukrainian and East European history", noting that "If it had been successfully implemented, the Commonwealth would finally have become a loose confederation of Poles, Lithuanians and Ruthenians. The missing Ukrainian buffer state would have come into being as the Commonwealth's eastern pillar. Russian expansion might have been checked and Poland spared the agonies of the Partitions or, perhaps just as likely, it might have struggled on longer as the 'Sick man of Europe'" (p. 65).

In spite of considerable Roman Catholic Clergy opposition, the Treaty of Hadiach was approved by Polish king and parliament (Sejm) on 22 May 1659, but with an emended text.[1] The idea of a Ruthenian Duchy within the Commonwealth was completely abandoned.[2] It was a Commonwealth attempt to regain influence over the Ukrainian territories, lost after the series of Cossack uprisings (like the Khmelnytsky Uprising) and growing influence of Muscovy over the Cossacks (like the 1654 Treaty of Pereyaslav).

Hetman Vyhovsky supported the negotiations with the Commonwealth, especially after he suppressed a revolt led by the colonel of Poltava, Martyn Pushkar, and severed relations with Tsardom of Russia for its violations of the Treaty of Pereyaslav of 1654.[3] The Treaty of Hadiach was, however, viewed by many Cossacks as 'too little, too late', and they especially opposed the agreement to return land property to the szlachta. After the 1648 revolt, the Commonwealth was very unpopular with ordinary Cossacks. Rank-and-file Cossacks saw Orthodox Moscow as their natural ally and did not care for alliance with the Commonwealth. Furthermore, Hadiach was too much a deal that merely benefited the elite of the Cossacks—the "starshyna"—who wanted to be recognized as equal to the Polish nobility. Thus, while some Cossacks, among them the hetman Ivan Vyhovsky supported the Commonwealth, many did not, and Cossack unrest continued in Ukraine.[4][not in citation given]

The Commonwealth position was further weakened by a string of losses in the Russo-Polish War (1654–67). The Tsar felt threatened by the Treaty of Hadiach, which weakened his hold on Cossacks. The Russians saw the treaty as an act of war, and even before it was ratified sent an army into Ukraine. Although Polish forces under hetman Stefan Czarniecki dealt defeat to Russian forces at the battle of Polonka, and recaptured Wilno in 1660, lack of other Commonwealth military successes, especially in Ukraine, further undermined Cossack support of the Commonwealth. Vyhovsky's early success at the battle of Konotop in June 1659 was not decisive enough, and was followed by a series of defeats. The Russian garrisons in Ukraine continued to hold out; a Zaporozhian attack on the Crimea forced Vyhovsky's Tatar allies to return home, and unrest broke out in the Poltava region. Finally, several pro-Russian colonels rebelled and accused Vyhovsky of "selling Ukraine out to the Poles."

Unable to continue the war, Vyhovsky resigned in October 1659 and retired to Poland. The situation was further complicated by the Ottoman Empire, which tried to gain control of the disputed region and played all factions against each other. Meanwhile, the Commonwealth was weakened by the rokosz of Jerzy Lubomirski.

In the end, Russia was victorious, as seen in the 1667 Treaty of Andrusovo and the 1686 Eternal Peace. Cossacks fell under the Russian sphere of influence, with much fewer privileges under the Hetmanate than would have been granted under the treaty of Hadiach. By the end of the 18th century, Cossack political influence has been almost completely destroyed by the Russian Empire.

File:BNR (Ruthienie Blanche) Map 1918.jpg 

Sunday, December 29, 2013

Belerus Is Polotsk

as suggested by such a name as POLOTSK : "POL + SK"

Less from migrations, and more via conquest and redefinition

Read the history:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polans_%28eastern%29

According to chronicalized legends, the largest cities of the eastern Polans were Kiev, Pereyaslav, Rodnia, Vyshhorod, Belgorod (now Bilohorodka village at the Irpin river) and Kaniv. In the 10th century, the term "Polans" was virtually out of use and exchanged for "Rus", with Polans as a tribe being last mentioned in a chronicle of 944.[3]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principality_of_Polotsk



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polock_Voivodship


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polesia



Saturday, December 28, 2013

Ukraine Split - Ghosts of the Polish-Lithuanian-Ruthenian Commonwealth

 http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/db/Principalities_of_Kievan_Rus%27_%281054-1132%29.jpg 

This article is from the blog http://mypolitikal.com/

http://mypolitikal.com/2010/08/25/analyzing-ukrainian-elections-part-2/

Two Ukraines

Modern Ukraine is a strange hybrid of two quite different regions. One part, composed of western and central Ukraine, is politically more aligned with the West; it favors, for instance, joining the European Union. This part includes the capital Kiev. The other part of Ukraine, consisting of the Black Sea coast and eastern Ukraine, remains more loyal to Russia and the memory of the Soviet Union. It includes Donetsk Oblast (formerly named Stalino Oblast), the most populous province in the country.

This division is reflected in Ukrainian politics. Take the 2004 presidential election, in which pro-Western candidate Viktor Yushchenko faced off against pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovych:



Few things better illustrate the boundary between east and west Ukraine than this election, which Mr. Yushchenko ended up winning by a seven-point margin.

These divisions have long-standing roots. During the 16th and 17th centuries, for instance, much of Ukraine was under the control of the Poland-Lithuania. This country, which at one point constituted the largest nation in Europe, declined in the 18th century and was eventually partitioned by its stronger neighbors Prussia, Russia, and Austria.

Here is a map of Poland-Lithuania at its peak:



As the map makes clear, there is a strong correlation between the parts of Ukraine once controlled by Poland-Lithuania and the parts of Ukraine that today vote for pro-Westerners such as Mr. Yushchenko. Although Poland-Lithuania is long gone, the vestiges of Polish influence still exist in these places, drawing western and central Ukraine closer to the West than eastern Ukraine and the Black Sea region. [emphasis added]

These two parts of Ukraine differ in another, even more important aspect: language. Take a look at the most Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine:



The correlation between the percentage of Russian speakers and the vote for pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovych is even stronger here. The three provinces with more than 60% of Russian-speakers gave Mr. Yanukovych’s his strongest support; Mr. Yanukovych managed to gain greater than 80% of the vote in each of them, despite losing the overall vote by 7%.

Language was a matter directly related to the Soviet Union. While on paper all languages were equal in the Soviet Union, in reality there was little question that speaking Russian was necessary to succeed. Today the situation is the opposite; the government encourages individuals to speak Ukrainian, although many in the country use Russian.

Ironically, Mr. Yanukovych himself is a native-born Russian-speaker. According to the Kiev Post, his Ukrainian remains imperfect to this day. The current president is reported to desire adding Russian to Ukraine’s list of official languages (which at the moment includes solely Ukrainian). This would be quite controversial if actually done.

Ukraine’s Future

Polarization, like that illustrated in the humorous picture above, is a disturbing phenomenon for any country. In Ukraine’s 2004 presidential election, all but one province gave more than 60% of the vote to a single candidate. This is the type of political division that sometimes leads to civil war, such as which occurred in Yugoslavia. That is one possible path for Ukraine to follow, unlikely as it may seem at the moment.

Yet polarization of this sort does not necessarily lead to separation. In the 2010 presidential election, polarization declined slightly; as memories fade, this trend may continue. And fortunately for Ukraine, the East-West division does not extend to ethnicity; Russian-speakers and Ukrainian-speakers may have a different language, but they look the same. It is a sad comment on the human condition that this makes a break-up of Ukraine less likely.

Moreover, a number of other countries contain similar electoral divisions without splitting up. Former East Germany votes quite differently from former West Germany (especially with regards to the Left Party, the ex-communist party), but Germany certainly will not break-up into pieces anytime soon. After the Civil War, the South unanimously supported one party for decades – parts of it still do, if one excludes blacks – but the idea of another national schism is unthinkable today. If things go well for Ukraine, the electoral divide in its voting patterns may remain nothing more than that.



Ukraine Split - Ghosts of the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth

http://continuingcounterreformation.blogspot.ro/2014/01/ukraine-split-ghosts-of-polish.html


The Reincarnation of the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth & Eastern Germany
 
http://continuingcounterreformation.blogspot.ro/2014/03/the-reincarnation-of-polish-lithuanian.html