Vladimir Ledochowski was a Polish aristocrat who by 1906 had demonstrated such exceptional skills in international diplomacy that Jesuit Superior General Franz Xavier Wernz (under whose tutelage Pacelli had done his postgraduate research in canon law) appointed him Consultor General for Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Bosnia, Serbia, Croatia, and Poland, as well as Belgium and the Netherlands.
“Consultor General” is the equivalent of a cabinet post. It empowered Ledochowski to lace the future of his nations with alliances that lay buried like so many land-mines. This is not an unusual feat for a Jesuit strategist. Indeed, the Society of Jesus (which is the pope's private CIA and veritable Mother of spies) is renowned for “Othelloizing” nations—setting them up for mutual destruction, as when Othello's trusted but treacherous advisor Iago gloats to the audience, “Now whether he kill Cassio or Cassio him, or each do kill the other, every way makes my gain.”
(It's foolish, in my opinion, not to suspect a covert military strategist of anything he has authority, means, and requirement to do. To ignore him is to be conquered by his strategy, which is usually to foster ignorance of his most decisive operations.)
Triggering World War
Most historians agree that the first World War was triggered by the Serbian Concordat of June 1914. Eugenio Pacelli was the Concordat's acknowledged author, but Vladimir Ledochowski had authority, means, and requirement to ghost it.
The Serbian Concordat promised (a) Vatican support of Serbia's liberation from Roman Catholic Austria-Hungary, while (b) pitting Roman Catholic evangelism against the Serbian state religion, Eastern Orthodoxy, a faith that denies the supremacy of the Roman papacy.
Such a policy was sure to provoke belligerency between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, just as Jesuit military strategy created enmity between America and Great Britain to incite a Revolution that resulted in the world's first republic governable by Roman Catholic laypersons. The underlying purpose of the Serbian Concordat, like the Declaration of Independence, was to restructure the world according to the requirements of Rome. What those requirements were we shall learn presently.
Four days after Eugenio Pacelli signed the Concordat, a Serbian terrorist assassinated the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne. Within weeks, nations with no more reason to make war than the alliances they had signed began outfitting their respective soldiery for what looked like Armageddon.
Death hit the Vatican, too. On August 19, 1914, Jesuit General Wernz died suddenly, followed the next day by Pope Pius X—of heartbreak, it was rumored, over the world's disintegration. To succeed Pius, the college of cardinals chose a professional diplomat, Giacomo della Chiesa, who assumed the name Benedict XV.
It took the Jesuits six months to elect a Superior General to succeed Wernz. There's no more powerful political office on earth than Superior General of the Society of Jesus. It commands absolute, unquestioned obedience. The proposition that Jesus Christ is to be seen in the person of the Superior General is repeated no less than five hundred times in the Society's Constitutions.
Vladimir Ledochowski was chosen General by his Jesuit electors.
The man idolized by Eugenio Pacelli now had full authority to cause America to desire war against Germany. We have heard many reasons why America entered World War I. Statesmen argued that it was “the war to end all wars,” while pacifists charged it was a war to support British imperialism. Actual outcome points to another, less apparent yet more practical reason.
The Purpose of World War I
Immediately upon assuming his Generalate, Vladimir Ledochowski fled Rome (Austria, after all, was now at war with Italy) and set up office with two assistants in his mother's castle at Zizers, Switzerland.
In 1917, Ledochowski invited Mathias Erzberger, a deputy from the German Catholic Center party, to Zizers for a secret meeting.
Erzberger later reported to friends that the General had persuaded him to support a strategy of destroying the unified Reich under the Protestant Kaiser Wilhelm II in order to bring the Catholic nations of central and eastern Europe together in a pan-German federation under a charismatic dictator charged with subduing the communist menace from the east.
Dr. Hans Carossa, documenting the deputy's fact patterns after Zizers, observed that “Every political maneuver that Erzberger has engaged in since his discussion with the Jesuit General has only served to advance this Jesuit political strategy.” (Manfred Barthel, The Jesuits, William Morrow, p. 254-5)
Key to this encirclement of Protestant Prussian led Germany were the alliances placing Germany on opposing sides with Russia and Great Britain:
A typical example of this was his "love-hate" relationship with the United Kingdom and in particular with his British cousins. He returned to England in January 1901 to be at the bedside of his grandmother, Queen Victoria, and was holding her in his arms at the moment of her death. Open armed conflict with Britain was never what Wilhelm had in mind—"a most unimaginable thing", as he once quipped—yet he often gave in to the generally anti-British sentiments within the upper echelons of the German government, conforming as they did to his own prejudices toward Britain which arose from his youth. When war came about in 1914, Wilhelm sincerely believed that he was the victim of a diplomatic conspiracy set up by his late uncle, Edward VII, in which Britain had actively sought to "encircle" Germany through the conclusion of the Entente Cordiale with France in 1904 and a similar arrangement with Russia in 1907. This is indicative of the fact that Wilhelm had a highly unrealistic belief in the importance of "personal diplomacy" between European monarchs, and could not comprehend that the very different constitutional position of his British cousins made this largely irrelevant. A reading of the Entente Cordiale shows that it was actually an attempt to put aside the ancient rivalries between France and Great Britain rather than an "encirclement" of Germany.
Similarly, he believed that his personal relationship with his cousin-in-law Nicholas II of Russia (see The Willy-Nicky Correspondence) was sufficient to prevent war between the two powers. At a private meeting at Björkö in 1905, Wilhelm concluded an agreement with his cousin which amounted to a treaty of alliance, without first consulting with Bülow. A similar situation confronted Czar Nicholas on his return to St. Petersburg, and the treaty was, as a result, a dead letter. But Wilhelm believed that Bülow had betrayed him, and this contributed to the growing sense of dissatisfaction he felt towards the man he hoped would be his foremost servant. In broadly similar terms to the "personal diplomacy" at Björkö, his attempts to avoid war with Russia by an exchange of telegrams with Nicholas II in the last days before the outbreak of the First World War came unstuck due to the reality of European power politics. His attempts to woo Russia were also seriously out of step with existing German commitments to Austria-Hungary. In a chivalrous fidelity to the Austro-Hungarian/German alliance, William informed the Emperor Franz Joseph I of Austria in 1889 that "the day of Austro-Hungarian mobilisation, for whatever cause, will be the day of German mobilisation too". Given that Austrian mobilisation for war would most likely be against Russia, a policy of alliance with both powers was obviously impossible.